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Towards a More Perfect European Human 
Rights Standard: A New Argument Against 
a United Kingdom Bill of Rights 
For the American concerned with European developments 
in human rights, perhaps no better time exists than the pres- 
ent to consider that community's movement towards a bill of 
rights.' Among the diplomatic and academic struggles which 
have attended Europe's most recent post-war forays into bill-of- 
rights thinking2 has been the United Kingdom's reluctance to 
either sign or fully embrace certain European human rights 
instruments.' This reluctance is rooted in domestic soil. While 
politicians and professors have debated the merits of a bill of 
rights: the United Kingdom has failed to adopt such a 
1. 1991 was recently celebrated as the two-hundredth anniversary of the Unit- 
ed States Bill of Rights. Now in its 202nd year, our Bill of Rights is celebrated as 
a precious document whose protections are an American citizen's greatest entitle- 
ment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) ("What 
more precious 'privilege' of American citizenship could there be than that privilege 
to claim the protections of our great Bill of Rights?"). For thoughtful discussions of 
the Bill of Rights and that document's impact upon American culture, law, and 
politics, see LEARNED HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); BERNARD S C H W m ,  THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY H I ~ R Y  (1971). 
2. .A concerted international movement to both enumerate and protect funda- 
mental human rights developed in the years following World War 11 and subse- 
quent revelations regarding Nazi war crimes. See JA. Andrews, The European 
Jurisprudence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REV. 463, 474-75 (1984); Roger Myers, 
A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping 
Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INTI & COMP. L. 3, 83 
n.432, 84 n.439 (1990); see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at  117 (1978) (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion) (recognizing that the European 
Convention was drafted in response to the horrors of World War In. 
3. See infia text accompanying notes 18-25. 
4. For a detailed discussion of the recent history of the bill of rights debate 
within the United Kingdom, see MICHAEL ZANDER, A BILL OF RIGHTS? 1-26 (3d ed., 
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1985). Concerning this debate, one commentator has dryly 
observed that "[a]lthough the debate on 'A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom' 
staggers on, with an occasional flurry of interest giving it new life, the prospects 
for such legislation do seem remote. Parliamentary and governmental interest . . . 
have since 1979 lain elsewhere." B.H., Book Note, 37 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 209, 210 
(1986) (reviewing ZANDEF~, supra). Both scholarship and polemics mark this debate. 
See generally DO WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS? (Colin M. Campbell ed., 1980); 
Jos~w JACONELLI, ENACTING A BIU OF RIGHTS: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS (1980) 
(containing arguments for and against a bill of rights) [hereinatbr JACONELLI I]; 
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This failure constitutes perhaps the primary obstacle to 
the United Kingdom's participation in European efforts to- 
wards a unified outlook on human rights. 
To the extent the United Kingdom's national doings influ- 
ence its actions abroad, an analysis of the United Kingdom's 
position regarding a European bill of rights necessarily impli- 
cates an analysis of its view regarding similar domestic legisla- 
tion. However, the more consequential-and far more over- 
looked-analysis concerns how European Convention6 process- ' 
es for ensuring personal liberties influence the manner in 
which the United Kingdom pursues its domestic human rights 
agenda. In developing this latter analysis, this comment argues 
that the United Kingdom should maintain its position against a 
domestic bill of rights in order t o  better facilitate the develop- 
ment of case law under the European Convention and, hence, 
aid the generation of a more comprehensive, uniform European 
standard of human rights. 
Section I1 of this comment provides a brief background 
discussion of the United Kingdom's position on human rights. 
Section I11 analyzes how the current United Kingdom position 
affects and enhances the creation of a clear human rights juris- 
prudence applicable on a continent-wide basis through the 
mechanisms of the European Convention. Section TV discusses 
the future of a European Community bill of rights and the 
United Kingdom's contribution to that future. In conclusion, 
this comment proposes that the United Kingdom not adopt a 
bill of human rights. Refusing to do so will, in the long run, 
become a substantial factor in unifylng European perspectives 
on human rights through aligning the United Kingdom with its 
European counterparts and facilitating the European Conven- 
tion process for administering and defining a European human 
rights standard. 
and Joseph Jaconelli, The European Convention on Human Rights-The Tent of a 
British Bill of Rights?, 1976 PUB. L. 226 (same) [hereinafter Jaconelli 111. 
5. Recent proposals made within the United Kingdom for an entrenched, do- 
mestic bill of rights have met objections similar to those made during the Constitu- 
tional Convention and ratification debates against the inclusion of a bill of rights 
within the U.S. Constitution. For a detailed treatment of such objections to a U.K. 
bill of rights, see ZANDER, supra note 4, at 27-82. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 
84 (Alexander Hamilton); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE 
FOR (Murray Dry ed., 1981). 
6. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]. 
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The United Kingdom's approach t o  international human 
rights-careful assessment, reservation, and hesitation to over- 
enumerate fundamental rights-is consistent with its rejection 
of a national bill of rights. Having a t  length considered such a 
bill,' the United Kingdom has continued its traditional cre- 
ation of constitutional rights through the common law and 
specific legislation rather than through a general proclama- 
tion.' 
In 1950, the United Kingdom signed the European Conven- 
tion for the Protection of Human Rights.' This document dif- 
fers from the earlier Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,'' which the United Kingdom also signed, in two im- 
portant respects. First, the Universal Declaration sought only 
to proclaim or recognize fundamental rights rather than bind 
signatory states," but the European Convention clearly seeks 
7. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
8. For a discussion of how constitutional rights are created within the United 
Kingdom, see 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A H I ~ R Y  OF ENGLISH LAW 406-597 (4th 
ed. 1936); 3 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 3.230.10-12, .15-24, at $5 1.3(A), 
1.4 (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1990). 
9. See European Convention, supra note 6. 
10. The European Convention was preceded two years earlier by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted without dissent by the United 
Nations General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A 
(1111, U N  Doc. N810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
11. As the Preamble to the Universal Declaration states: 
The Geneml Assembly 
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common 
standard for achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
every individual and every organ of society, . . . shall strive . . . to pro- 
mote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, 
national and i n t e m t w d .  to secure their universal and effective reconni- 
tioh and observance, both 'among the peoples of the Member States them- 
selves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 
Universal Declaration, supra note 10, at  71 (third and fourth emphases added). But 
see Myers, supra note 2, at 86-87 ("[A]lthough the [Universal] Declaration was 
originally non-binding on member states, it has assumed the status of mandatory 
customary i n t e n a t w d  law, having been re-ed without opposition countless 
times within the United Nations,, incorporated into several national constitutions, 
and in practice invoked as if legally binding.") (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
Myers suggests that his view gained wide acceptance by the 1960s. Id. Others 
share a more guarded view of the Universal Declaration's international legal force. 
See, eg.,  JACONELLI I ,  supra note 4, at 247 (Universal Declaration "not conceived 
as imposing legal obligations and has, at most, the charader of customary interna- 
tional law"). 
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to legally bind its signatories.12 Second, the European Conven- 
tion provides a mechanism to secure compliance with its provi- 
sions. This enforcement mechanism takes the form of two judi- 
cial bodies, the European Commission of Human Rights1' and 
the European Court of Human Rights.14 
In 1961, the Council of Europe15 introduced the European 
Social Charter,16 an international instrument intended to se- 
cure social and economic rights." The United Kingdom led the 
opposition to the European Social Charter, which was eventual- 
ly ratified in 1965." One year later, the United Nations 
opened for signature two additional human rights documents: 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightslg and 
12. Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states the follow- 
ing: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdic- 
tion the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention." European 
Convention, supra note 6, art. 1. 
13. See infra part IIIA.1. 
14. See infra part IIIA.2. 
15. The Council of Europe is an international human rights body based in 
Strasbourg, France. Its 23 member states are also signatory states, or "High Con- 
tracting Parties," to the European Convention, the Council of Europe's premier 
human rights document. In addition to the United Kingdom, the Council's member 
states include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Turkey. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECT- 
ED TEXTS 68 (1987). As of spring, 1990, several Eastern European states were 
applying to become parties to the European Convention as a precondition to mem- 
bership in the Council of Europe. Stephan Breitenmoser & Gunter E. Wilms, Hu- 
man Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. I m  L. 845, 845 n.2 
(1990). 
16. European Social Charter, opened for sigmture Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 
89 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965). 
17. See FRANR NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUM N RIGHTS 
463 (1990). The European Social Charter also includes an implementation proce- 
dure which requires signatory states to report on domestic application of the 
Charteis provisions. Id. 
18. See Mary F. Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The European 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ .  639, 646 
11.25 (1990-91). For discussions of the history and import of the European Charter, 
see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: ORIGINS, OPERATION, 
RESULTS (1981); DAVID HARRIS, THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER (1984). See also 
Dominick, supra, at  658-67 (comparing European Community's European Social 
Charter with the Commission of European Communities' Community Charter); 
Mark Gould, The European Social Charter and Community Law-A Comment, 14 
EUR. L. REV. 223 (1989) (arguing that the Charter has very limited significance as 
a source of Community law when compared to other documents in a "hierarchie 
des sources" for such law); Alan J. Riley, The European Social Charter and Com- 
munib Law, 14 EUR. L. REV. 80 (1989) (arguing that the Charter is a significant 
part of Community law). 
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
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the International Covenant on Economic and Social  right^.^' 
Like the European Convention, both Covenants placed legal 
obligations upon ratifying states t o  honor the rights enumerat- 
ed therein21 However, like its approach to the European So- 
cial Charter, the United Kingdom stalled its acceptance of 
these rights-creating instruments, ratifying them only shortly 
before they entered into force in 1976.22 
In 1989, the United Kingdom proffered the sole dissent to 
the European Council's adoption of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of  worker^.^^ Unlike the European 
Convention, which protects primarily civil and political rights, 
the Community Charter's thirty articles enumerate ten funda- 
mental social and economic rights of both workers and citi- 
z e n ~ . ~ ~  Originally submitted to the Council of Ministers of the 
European Communities by the Commission of the European 
Communities, the Community Charter has been characterized 
as the Commission's "second major step in ten years toward a 
[European] Community bill of rights."25 Rather than adopt 
such a measure, the United Kingdom has preferred to take a 
lone diplomatic position among its European peers, resisting 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
20. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
21. Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pro- 
vides: "Each [Contracting State] . . . undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant . . . ." International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, supm note 19, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. This Covenant sets forth an 
unqualified duty to "ensure" Covenant rights. In contrast, the International Cove- 
nant on Economic and Social Rights is more tentative, requiring only that states 
work towards greater rights in those areas. Article 2(1) of the Covenant states the 
following: "Each [Contracting State] undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation . . . to the maximum of its avail- 
able resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative measures." International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 20, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. 
22. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
23. See Dominick, supra note 18, at 640 n.2. The European Council is the Eu- 
ropean Community's ruling body. Based in Brussels, Belgium, the European Com- 
munity is a union of the following twelve member states: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Each of the European Com- 
munity member states belong to the larger Council of Europe, which includes 23 
member states. See supra note 15. 
24. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN FILE: 
COMMUNITY CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS FOR WORKERS (May 1990). 
25. See Dominick, supra note 18, at  639. 
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further efforts to generally define and enforce a binding Euro- 
pean catalogue of fundamental rights, especially social and 
economic rights. 
The United Kingdom's refusal to adopt a domestic bill of 
rights,26 coupled with its expressed resistance to similar inter- 
national documents, creates the temptation to view the United 
Kingdom as antagonistic to human rights. However, such a 
view is unwarranted. Ratification of the European Convention 
demonstrates a commitment to a substantive human rights 
program. An inquiry centering on the European Convention as 
a rights-creating mechanism will more ably explain that com- 
mitment. This is true because out of all the international in- 
struments signed by the United Kingdom, the European Con- 
vention has exercised-and continues to exercise-the most 
substantial influence upon that nation's human rights policy 
and jurisprudence. As the following section argues, when that 
influence is measured against the United Kingdom's current 
position against a domestic bill of rights, the need for a domes- 
tic bill becomes subordinate to the greater need to develop 
European Convention law which will further increase the 
Convention's nonnative influence upon the United Kingdom. 
111. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION: THE CREATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. European Convention Adjudicative Provisions 
The European Convention created a sophisticated mech- 
anism for enforcing human rights.27 Two judicial tribunals 
26. The United Kingdom's present failure to ensure its populace fundamental 
rights through the medium of a bill of rights has produced two results. First, no 
comprehensive statement of rights, and thus no equally comprehensive catalogue of 
remedies, exists for those who would seek to enforce human rights in the United 
Kingdom courts. Second, although the United Kingdom has, by virtue of the Euro- 
pean Convention, agreed to secure certain rights to those within in its borders, see 
supm note 12 and accompanying text, no judicial machinery now exists to enforce 
many of those rights in domestic courts. Those seeking to enforce Convention 
rights must engage European Convention processes and . thus adjudicate their 
claims in Strasbourg, France, the seat of the adjudicative machinery currently in 
effect under the European Convention. See i n h  part IIIA. 
27. One commentator has noted that "the judicial machinery established pursu- 
ant to the European Convention on Human Rights is considered the most advanced 
and effective system for the protection of human rights in the world." John P. 
Groarke, Comment, Reuolutionaries Beware: The E,msion of the Po2itica2 Offense 
Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition 
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
exercise adjudicative authority under the convention: the Euro- 
pean Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights.28 
1. European Commission of Human Rights 
The European Commission of Human Rights is a twenty- 
three member panel with a representative from each signatory 
to the European C o n ~ e n t i o n , ~ ~  A state or individual who has 
suffered a human rights violation may petition the European 
Commission for redress of a signatory state's violation of the 
European Conventi~n;~ provided that the party first exhausts 
all remedies within its national legal system.31 After investi- 
gating a complaint's factual allegati0ns,3~ the Commission at- 
tempts to arrange a settlement between the parties.33 If this 
attempt fails, the Commission makes a preliminary determina- 
tion on the merits of the complaint in the form of a report stat- 
ing whether the defendant state has violated the European 
C~nvent ion .~~ Within three months of the report, either the 
Commission or any of the named state parties may bring the 
case before the European Court of Human Rights.35 In cases 
Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1515, 1544 (1988). 
28. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234. 
29. Id. art. 20. For a detailed explanation of how the European Commission of 
Human Rights operates, see J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1987); P. VAN DLJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 
1990). 
30. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. a t  236. See Ros- 
alyn Higgins, The European Convention on Human Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 495, 505-06 (T. Meron ed., 1984). 
31. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, 213 UN.T.S. at 238. Exhaus- 
tion of legal remedies is a chief requirement for claims brought under the Europe- 
an Convention. 
32. The Commission's factual determination is accompanied by a written opinion 
issued to each party, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and the 
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. The opinion is also published. See 
European Convention, supra note 6, art. 30, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240. 
33. Id. art. 28, 213 U.N.T.S. a t  238-40; see Higgins, supra note 30, a t  506; see 
also European Convention, supra note 6, art. 47, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246 (The Court 
"may only deal with a case after the Commission has acknowledged the failure of 
efforts for a friendly settlement."). 
34. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 31, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240; see 
Higgins, supm note 30, a t  506-07. 
35. European Convention, supm note 6, arts. 32, 44, 47, & 48, 213 U.N.T.S. a t  
240-42, 246; see Higgins, supra note 30, at 507. The European Convention contains 
no provision allowing individual petitioners themselves to bring cases before the 
European Court of Human Rights. Although an individual may initiate Convention 
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where no such action is taken, the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe decides whether the European Conven- 
tion has been violated.36 Signatory states "undertake to regard 
as binding" decisions reached by the Committee of  minister^.^^ 
2. European Court of Human Rights 
Like the Commission, the European Court of Human 
Rights3' is comprised of twenty-three elected judges, one from 
each member state of the Council of Eur~pe .~ '  When a case is 
properly presented to the Court, seven members, who comprise 
a chamber, hear the case.40 Any decision reached thereafter is 
final4' and binding upon member states.42 Following a judg- 
ment by the Court, the Committee of Ministers supervises its 
execution.43 
The European Convention empowers the Court to hear 
cases raising questions of interpretation regarding Convention 
p ro~ i s ions .~~  As will be discussed, this interpretive role pro- 
vides the foundation upon which a singular corpus-and per- 
haps theory-of European human rights law can begin to be 
built. 
judicial processes by bringing a petition before the European Commission of Hu- 
man Rights, only the Commission or a state named in the petition has power to 
bring the case before the Court. Presumably the Commission protects individual 
claimants' interests through its power to refer cases to the Court if a named state 
party refuses to do so. 
36. European Convention, supm note 6, art. 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240. Any 
violation must be found by a two-thirds majority of the Committee. 
37. Id. art. 32(4). 
38. For a detailed analysis of the duties and functions of the European Court 
of Human Rights, see sources cited supra note 29. 
39. European Convention, supra note 6, arts. 38, 39, 213 U.N.T.S. at  242-44; 
see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
40. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 43, 213 U.N.T.S. at 244. 
41. Id. art. 52, 213 U.N.T.S. at  248. 
42. Id. art. 53 (Member states "undertake to abide by the decision of the Court 
in any case to which they are parties."). 
43. Id. art. 54. 
44. Article 45 of the European Convention provides: "The jurisdiction of the 
Court shall extend to all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the 
present Convention which the High Contracting Parties or the Commission shall 
refer to it in accordance with Article 48." Id. art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246 (empha- 
sis added). 
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B. The Interpretive Role of the European Court 
of Human Rights: Creating a New European 
Jurisprudence of Human Rights 
The non-binding character of the Universal Declaration 
and the two European Covenants allowed each state to deter- 
mine for itself how to achieve the human rights aspirations of 
these documents.45 Although such freedom also exists under 
the European Convention, i t  is more limited. Because the Con- 
vention provides an enforcement mechanism, it binds signato- 
ries not merely with aspirational pronouncements, but also 
with case law. Thus, the European Convention has been char- 
acterized as "a law-making treaty the object of which is to 
oblige the parties to apply certain rules of international law 
and, if necessary, to add or modifi their national law for this 
purpose."46 As a result, the European Convention assumes a 
sui generis character.47 That is, as a law-making force, the 
Convention transcends the "traditional boundaries between 
international and domestic law,'"'' thereby establishing "a new 
legal order designed to substitute for the particular systems of 
individual states a common European order."49 Thus, signato- 
ry states are subject to a common law supreme to their own na- 
tional law within the sphere of human rights. As the final5' 
arbiter of states' duties under the European Convention, the 
European Court of Human Rights assumes the ultimate role of 
45. See ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION I  
DOMESTIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 21-22 (1983): 
[Allthough the duty to bring domestic law into line with international 
contractual obligations certainly exists, international law is silent with 
regard to the means by which this object is to be achieved. Such confor- 
mity is a matter of domestic concern, normally determined by constitu- 
tional provisions and practice of each state. 
46. Arnold D. McNair, The European Convention of 1950 for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in TIIE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 9, 27 (81st Lionel Cohen Lecture, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1962) 
(emphases added). 
47. DR~EMCZE~SKI, supra note 45, at 23 (citing A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 231 (1977)). 
48. Andrews, supra note 2, at 466. 
49. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 45, at 23 (citing A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 231 (1977)). 
50. The European Commission of Human Rights is considered the chief arbiter 
of whether state action violates the Convention. See supra part IIIA.1. However, 
ultimate questions of interpretation are left strictly within the province of the 
Court. 
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defining normative standards among member states for those 
classes of rights enumerated in the European C~nvent ion .~~ 
Thus, initially it appears that the Court is uniquely poised 
to shape, if not ultimately determine, the path of human rights 
law among the European Convention's member states.52 Even 
among nonmember nations, the Court's decisions can be ex- 
pected to influence developing attitudes towards human rights. 
Of course, for the Court to play such a vital role in the 
evolution of European human rights law, its decisions must be 
legally compelling. Signatory states regularly accept and abide 
by decisions reached through European adjudicative processes. 
In numerous cases, decisions by either the Commission or the 
Court have prompted remedial action by the defendant state, 
often amidst significant political pressure to act otherwise, and 
sometimes even before the Court announces its decision. Three 
such instances involving the United Kingdom will be consid- 
ered in the following pages. 
1. The Golder Case 
In the Golder Case5s the Court held that certain British 
prison regulations violated the European Convention. The se- 
ries of regulations under review in Golder allowed prison au- 
thorities t o  control communications between prisoners and 
outside legal counsel. The applicant, Mr. Sidney Golder, was an 
inmate accused of being involved in an altercation that injured 
a prison guard.54 Some time later, Golder attempted to write 
both a representative in Parliament and a Chief C ~ n s t a b l e . ~ ~  
However, pursuant to  the Prison Rules then in force, the prison 
governor prevented Golder from doing so.56 Additionally, 
51. Certain classes of rights, primarily economic, are not protected by the Eu- 
ropean Convention. Cf. Universal Declaration, supra note 10, arts. 22-25, at 83 
(proclaiming economic rights). 
52. See infra part III.C.2. 
53. 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975). The Golder Case was the first individual 
application from the United Kingdom to reach the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
54. 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at  8-9. 
55. Id. at 8. 
56. Regarding the Prison Rules, the Court made the following finding: 
In England the matter of contacts of convicted prisoners with persons 
outside their place of detention is governed by the Prison Act 1952, as 
amended, and subordinate legislation made under that Act. 
Section 47, sub-section I, of the Prison Act provides that "the Secre- 
tary of State [Home Secretary] may make rules for the regulation and 
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Britain's Home Secretary denied Golder permission to consult 
an attorney.57 In response, Golder submitted to the Commis- 
sion a complaint alleging violations of European Convention 
Articles 6(1)58 and 8.59 
Upon review, the Commission reported that the Prison 
Rules improperly denied Mr. Golder the rights of access to the 
courts and to legal counsel.60 Building upon the Commission's 
report, the Court interpreted the Articles in question to confer 
these rights on prisoners, and found that the restrictions violat- 
ed Golder's rights.61 In response to the Court's holding, the 
British government promptly removed the offending regulations 
and substituted new regulations in their place.62 
2. Ireland v. United Kingdom 
Ireland v. United Kingdom63 provides a second example of 
how European Convention judicial processes have prompted 
remedial action. In this case both the European Commission 
and the Court of Human Rights considered Ireland's claims 
that the United Kingdom had subjected Irish citizens t o  "inhu- 
management of prisoners . . . and for the . . . treatment . . . discipline 
and control of persons required to be detained . . . ." 
The rules made by the Home Secretary in the exercise of this power 
are the Prison Rules 1964, which were laid before Parliament and have 
the status of [statutory law]. 
Id. at  9 (emphasis added). Rules 33(2) and 34(8) prohibited inmates from commu- 
nicating with "any outside person" unless granted leave by the Home Secretary. Id. 
at 10. 
57. Id. 
58. "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law." 
European Convention, supm note 6, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 228; see 18 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) at 13 e[T]he 'right' which Golder wished, rightly or wrongly, to in- 
voke against [the guard who identified him] was a 'civil right' within the meaning 
of Article 6 Q 1."). 
59. Article 8 provides: "(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his . . . corre- 
spondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exer- 
cise of this right e x ~ p t  such as is in accordance with law and is necessary . . . 
[to] national security, public safety [or certain other enumerated state interests]." 
European Convention, supra note 6, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at  230. 
60. 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20. 
61. Id. 
62. RICHARD B. LILUCH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 583 (1979). But see Eric Leigh, Prison Rules Negate 
Spirit of Court Ruling', THE TIMES (London), Aug. 21, 1975, at 2, cited in LILLICH 
& NEWMAN, supra, at 585. 
63. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). 
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man o r  degrading treatment" in violation of Article 3 of the 
European C~nvent ion .~~ The Irish government alleged that 
United Kingdom Security Forces subjected suspected members 
of the Irish Republican Army to a series of degrading interroga- 
tion techniques.65 The British government claimed the tech- 
niques were warranted given the existence of a public emer- 
gency in Northern Ireland at the time of interr~gat ion.~~ In 
fact, both the Commission and the Court found a state of emer- 
gency but they still condemned the  technique^.^' 
Ireland brought its complaint against the United Kingdom 
in 1971.69 In December 1975, after the Commission com- 
menced fact-finding and earnest consideration of the matter, 
but before it rendered an opinion, the British government 
abandoned its use of the offending interrogation  technique^.^' 
At least one commentator has suggested the United Kingdom 
acted remedially, anticipating adverse findings by the Europe- 
an Comrni~sion.~~ Moreover, following the Commission's pub- 
lished findings in 1976, Ireland secured from the British gov- 
ernment an unconditional declaration that such interrogation 
techniques would never be used again.72 The unqualified 
nature of such an act speaks well of the Commission's influence 
on a politically significant decision. 
3. The Soering Case 
Perhaps the most significant recent case illustrating the 
normative force of the Court of Human Rights is the Soering 
64. Id. a t  60-72. Article 3 of the European Convention provides that "[lo one 
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish- 
ment." European Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224. 
65. These techniques included forcing suspects to stand for an extended time 
against a wall while resting their weight on their fingers and toes, covering their 
heads with black hoods, subjecting them to a high-volume hissing noise, and de- 
priving them of adequate sleep, food, and water. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41. 
66. Id. a t  77-78. See European Convention, supra note 6, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. 
at  232-34 (State derogation from European Convention is permitted in some in- 
stances of "public emergency," but only "to the extent strictly required by the exi- 
gencies of the situation."). 
67. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 78. 
68. Id a t  94-95; Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310171, 28 
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 278, 285 (1978). 
69. See LILLICH & NEWMAN, supm note 62, at  589. 
70. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 82. 
71. See Higgins, supra note 30, at  509. 
72. See Britain on the Dock, ECONOMIS~, Apr. 30, 1977, at  14, cited in LILLICH 
& NEWMAN, supra note 62, at 615-16. 
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Case.73 In Soering, the Court considered whether the extradi- 
tion of a capital murder suspect from the United Kingdom to 
Virginia would violate European Convention proscriptions 
against "torture"74 or "inhuman or degrading treatment or 
p~nishment,"~~ given conditions existing for death row prison- 
ers in the United States.I6 
Soering was a German national attending college in Vir- 
ginia. When his girlfriend's parents were murdered in March 
1985, Soering and his girlfriend fled Virginia.77 In April 1986, 
Soering was arrested in E~~gland.~'  Following Soering's arrest, 
the United States government requested extradition pursuant 
to an existing extradition treaty." Soering began judicial pro- 
ceedings under the European Convention to block extradition, 
alleging that his extradition to the United States would violate 
Article 3 of the European Con~ention.'~ Virginia was seeking 
the death penalty ,which might subject him to adverse condi- 
tions on Virginia's death row.'' 
The Court first determined that exposure to the "death row 
phenomenon" would violate Article 3.82 The Court then held 
that Article 3 imposes a duty upon contracting states t o  refuse 
extradition in cases that present a substantial risk of an Article 
3 vi~lation.'~ In response t o  the Court's ruling, the United 
73. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
74. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at  224. 
75. Id. 
76. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at  26-28. 
77. Id. at 11. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at  12. See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K.-N.Ir., 28 U.S.T. 
227, 229, 1049 U.N.T.S. 167, 169 (specifying that Contracting Parties agree to 
extradite "any personn accused or convicted of specific offenses "committed within 
the jurisdiction of the other Party"). 
80. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15. 
81. Id. at 30-31. The Court considered evidence provided by Mr. Soering regard- 
ing the "death row phenomenon," including "evidence of extreme stress, psychologi- 
cal deterioration and risk of homosexual abuse and physical attack undergone by 
prisoners on death row." Id. at  25, 27. 
82. Id. at 44-45. 
83. The Court stated: 
Extradition in such circumstances . . . would plainly be contrary to the 
spirit and intendment of [Article 31, and in the Court's view this inherent 
obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive 
would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhu- 
man or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article. 
Id. at 35. 
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Kingdom refused to extradite Soering to the United States 
until the capital murder charges against him were dropped.84 
Each of the preceding decisions-Golder, Ireland v. United 
Kingdom, and Soering4emonstrates the extent to which the 
European Convention's binding authority is recognized within 
the United Kingd~m.'~ Each case also demonstrates the de- 
gree to which judicial processes set forth under the Convention 
constitute an effective mechanism to  protect human rights.86 
Finally, these cases suggest the dynamic potential of the 
Court's power to interpret the Convention. The Court is 
uniquely positioned to create charismatic, forward-moving 
human rights case law for its member nations. The deference 
which the United Kingdom accords the Court's decisions sug- 
gests its willingness to view the Convention machinery as prop- 
erly creating a European "common law" of human rights. Such 
a process corresponds to, and complements, the United 
Kingdom's traditional rights-creating mechanisms. 
84. Soering remained in British custody until his extradition to the United 
States in January 1990, after American authorities removed the death penalty 
charges then pending against him. Regina C. D o ~ e u y ,  Comment, Soering v. Unit- 
ed Kingdom: Whethw the Continued Use of the Death Penalty in the United States 
Contradicts International Thinking?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CW. CONFINE- 
MENT 340 n.6 (1990); see NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supm note 17, at 477 n.6. 
85. Another example is the Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1979). Sunday Times involved one of the most politically charged rights-freedom 
of expression. The Sunday Times began publishing a series of articles about the 
deformative effects of thalidomide upon children. However, the United Kingdom's 
highest judicial authority, the House of Lords, enjoined the Times from publishing 
further articles, reasoning that to do otherwise would cause the public to form 
biases about certain issues surrounding then-pending civil negligence litigation 
against the drug's manufacturer, and thus constitute contempt. Id. at  20. Ultimate- 
ly, the case was laid before the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled 
that the House of Lords' injunction breached the paper's right to free expression 
under Article 10 of the Convention. Id. at 45. In response-and amidst a great 
deal of political tumultParliament enacted legislation effectively overruling the 
House of Lords' decision. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, ch. 49, 9 5; see MARK W. 
JANE & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 96-116 (1990) (discussing 
Sunday Times and the Court's influence upon U.K. law); Anthony Lester, The 
Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 552-54 
(1988) (same). 
86. See also DRZEMCZEWSKI, supm note 45, at 186-87 (citing cases brought 
under the European Convention involving. the United Kingdom and which have 
resulted in substantive changes in both United Kingdom law and social policy); 
Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-10 (1978) (In response to a Commission 
report, the Isle of Mann amended its law to lessen the degree of corporal punish- 
ment administered.); Reed v. United Kingdom, App No. 7245132, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
136 (1979) (agreement to alter regulations concerning prisoners' rights to complain 
of prison treatment) (friendly settlement). 
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C. Domestic Human Rights Aims in the European Context 
The previous analysis i l lustrates the European 
Convention's substantive capacity to enforce its provisions 
within the United Kingdom. One response to the exercise of 
that capacity emphasizes the negative international public 
relations aspect of adverse Court rulings. For example, in an 
oblique 1985 reference t o  judgments such as Ireland v. United 
Kingdom and Golder, Lord Scarman of the House of Lords 
referred to  these types of decisions as "embarrassments" to  the 
United Kingdom among the international and European com- 
m~nities.~'  Insofar as these decisions considered United King- 
dom law as having failed at various points to secure rights set 
forth in the European Convention, Lord Scarman called for 
"urgent remedial action7' granting the Convention the force of 
statute within the United Kingdom.88 
Lord Scarman's concern is focused primarily on political 
opinion. This concern, although important, is misplaced given 
the instant context. On balance, the positive aspects of the 
Court's decisions outweigh any potentially negative public rela- 
tions effects. Indeed, in Soering, the Court was careful to em- 
phasize the United Kingdom's good faith and propriety in seek- 
ing review of the case.89 Clearly, such qualities hardly present 
occasion for embarrassment. Rather, as the following analysis 
suggests, the positive results emanating from the United 
Kingdom's particular status-that of not possessing an en- 
trenched bill of rights-arguably work to advance the specific 
aims set forth in the European Convention. 
87. Leslie Scarman, Foreword to ZANDER, supra note 4, at v; see also Jaconelli 
11, supm note 4 (discussing issue of airing the United Kingdom's dirty laundry 
abroad). 
88. Leslie Scarman, Foreword to ZANDER, supra note 4, at  v. Lord Scarman 
preceded his 1985 call to arms in 1974 when he presented his well-known Wamlyn 
Lectures" on a bill of human rights for the United Kingdom. See ZANDER, supra 
note 4, at 8-10. 
89. The Court stated: 
This finding in no way puts in question the good faith of the United 
Kingdom Government, who have from the outset of the present proceed- 
ings demonstrated their desire to abide by their Convention obligations, 
firstly by staying the applicant's surrender to the United States authori- 
ties in accord with the interim measures indicated by the Convention 
institutions and secondly by themselves referring the case to the Court 
for a judicial ruling. 
Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45 (1989). 
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1. Aims of the European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention's fundamental human rights 
aspirations are stated in the Convention's Preamble, which 
emphasizes a profound belief in the necessity of maintaining "a 
common understanding and observance of the Human Rights 
upon which [fundamental freedoms] depend.'*' The Preamble 
thus views the Convention as a tool for ensuring "the collective 
enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration.'*' 
Acting on such proclamations, both the Commission and 
the Court have expounded the Convention's distinctive, pre- 
eminent mission of creating a common, European public order. 
In Austria v. Italy,92 the Commission reported that the 
Convention's purpose was "to establish a common public order 
of the free democracies of Europe.'*3 This view was further 
developed in the Commission's report in Ireland v. United 
Kingd~rn.'~ Professor Sperduti noted in his concurring opinion 
that by ratifying the Convention, member states "each accepted 
an obligation towards all the others t~gether."'~ That obliga- 
tion necessarily implicates "the ties of solidarity which the 
State Parties intended to create between themselves with a 
view to establishing a European public order.'*6 Building upon 
the Commission's report, the Court in Ireland v. United King- 
dom emphasized the Convention's role in uniting member 
states under a single, enforceable catalogue of fundamental 
rights." 
90. European Convention, supra note 6, pmbl., 213 U.N.T.S. a t  222. 
91. Id. 
92. 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 112 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). Austria v. Italy 
is also known as the Pfunders case. See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 29, at 
635. 
93. 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 138. As the Commission explained, 
it follows that a High Contracting Party, when it refers an alleged breach 
of the Convention to the Commission under Article 24, is not to be re- 
garded as exercising a right of action for the purpose of enforcing its own 
rights, but rather as bringing before the Commission an alleged violation 
of the public order of Europe. 
Id. at 140 (emphasis added). 
94. App. No. 5310171, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 516 (Eur. Comm'n. on H.R. 
1976). 
95. Id. at 497 (separate opinion regarding interpretation of Article 1 of Europe- 
an Convention), quoted in DRZEMCZEWSRI, supra note 45, at 25. 
96. Id. (second emphasis added). 
97. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4, 90-91 (1978). The Court stated: "Unlike 
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The unique Yaw-making" role of- the European Court of 
Human Rightsg8 and the binding authority of the Convention 
combine to establish a singular means for the realization of the 
fundamental human rights aspirations set forth in the 
Convention's Preamble across a broad, European context. Be- 
sides binding parties named in  its judgments, the European 
Court of Human Rights also creates case law that enunciates 
human rights standards for all Council of Europe nations. 
"Judgments of the . . . Court often have important consequenc- 
es for the laws and practices of member states which are not 
parties to the particular case under review.'*9 The Court's in- 
fluence is also felt outside the Council of Europe: 
[Court decisions] also have strong persuasive authority with 
the younger Inter-American Commission and Court of Human 
Rights and the U.N. Human Rights Committee. 
The twelve member states of the Council of Europe that 
also belong to the European Economic Community, or Com- 
mon Market, have made adherence to the Convention a virtu- 
al condition of membership of the European Community . . . . 
The European Court of Justice, which sits in Luxembourg, 
[also] has regard for the Convention and United States law 
when interpreting Community law.loO 
2. The "supreme court" function of the European Court of 
Human Rights 
As interpreter of Convention provisions, the European 
Court of Human Rights gives final expression to the 
Convention's binding authority. The Court's status and ability 
to define and ensure compliance with European Convention 
norms is analogous to the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
American constitutional law. I n  March v. Belgi~m,'~' the 
European Court likened its authority to the constitutional 
courts of specific Council of Europe member states.lo2 The 
U.S. Supreme Court, like the European constitutional courts, 
international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere 
reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates over and above a 
network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words 
of the preamble, benefit from a 'collective enforcement.' " Id. at 90. 
98. See supm part 1113. 
99. Lester, supra note 85, at 540. 
100. Id. 
101. 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
102. Id. at 36-37. 
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functions as the final judicial arbiter of constitutional law.lo3 
The European Convention places its Court in a nearly identical 
posture. 
However, one striking practical difference exists between 
the two Courts: the respective number of decisions each Court 
hears and decides. In its short history the European Court of 
Human Rights has decided approximately 151 cases.lo4 In 
contrast, between 1985 and 1989 the U.S. Supreme Court cur- 
rently decided an average of 164 decisions per year.105 This 
allows the European Court more time to consider each case. A 
second, related difference between the two tribunals is the 
scope of their jurisdiction. The European Court's authority of 
review extends to less than half the number of jurisdictions 
overseen by the Supreme Court.''' 
Viewed against the background of U.K. law, these differ- 
ences suggest two reasons why litigating European Convention- 
based human rights before European Convention tribunals is 
desirable.''' First, parties seeking redress have access to the 
full weight of the Convention process to litigate the merits of 
the claim. Meritorious demands, once vindicated, are endorsed 
by a demonstrably compelling legal authority. In addition, since 
that authority is supreme, its ruling is non-appealable;lo8 pri- 
103. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); see U.S. 
CONST. art. 111, $8 1-2. 
104. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supm note 17, at 465. The authors suggest 
the European Court of Human Rights has decided few cases because the vast ma- 
jority of applications submitted to the Commission (about 96%) fail to meet the 
Convention's rigid admissibility requirements. Id. at 464; see European Convention, 
supm note 6, arts. 24-27, 213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38. However, the Commission's nar- 
row reading of these requirements "has increased state confidence in the Conven- 
tion over its more than thirty-five year existence." NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra 
note 17, a t  464. As of January 1, 1989, the European Commission had decided 286 
cases, 180 of which it referred to the Court. Id at  464-65. 
105. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS 103 (1990). 
106. Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights includes the 23 Coun- 
cil of Europe member nations. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over matters arising within all GRy states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam, in addition 
to its federal jurisdiction. 
107. Because the United Kingdom has not adopted the European Convention into 
its domestic law, individuals seeking to invoke Convention provisions per se must 
do so in Strasbourg rather than before a domestic tribunal; hence, engaging the 
Convention's judicial machinery is not only desirable but also necessary for cases 
in which U.K. law is either defective or silent concerning a given remedy for viola- 
tions of rights protected by the Convention. 
108. In many cases, it may be more efficient for claims to invoke European 
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mary recourse to a forum of last resort may present significant 
economic advantages for each party to a dispute.log 
Second, these cases provide the Court with a prime oppor- 
tunity to develop the normative standards of the Conven- 
tion.''' These standards may then be applied with greater 
success across the European Community, in accord with the 
Convention's stated desire to create unity and establish a 
European public order. Benefits to the United Kingdom would 
ensue from a more refined standard upon which to base its 
domestic human rights policy. 
"It is primarily in the Court's judgments that a European 
jurisprudence of human rights is being developed."'" But the 
system is young and "has compiled its body of jurisprudence 
slowly."1* Although Convention tribunals have a compelling 
authority and impact, their jurisprudence needs cultivating. 
Convention processes rather than engage a domestic tribunal. Cases like Soering, 
which compel a definitive explication of Convention provisions, will almost certainly . 
be appealed to the Convention tribunals anyway. 
109. But see Andrews, supra note 2, at  487. Andrews characterizes the process 
as "expensive, complicated, and protracted." Id. Because Article 26 requires that all 
local remedies be exhausted before the European Commission may consider a given 
claim, European Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, 213 U.N.T.S. at  213, Andrews 
suggests that "[i]ncorporation [of the European Convention into domestic United 
Kingdom law] may be the most efficient and effective approach to protection of 
human rights in the long run." Andrews, supra note 2, at 487. The exhaustion 
requirement apparently functions as a check to assure that claims brought before the 
Commission are meritorious, and also to assure that a given member state has had 
an opportunity to comply with its duties under the Convention. 
Although the rule is indeed a hurdle, it is far from insurmountable. It would 
appear, too, to be less so in the absence of a domestic bill of rights. Ironically, a 
fully-developed domestic catalogue of rights would necessarily compel an equally 
mature catalogue of corresponding remedies. As a result, the more extensive the 
inventory of remedies at home, the fewer opportunities petitioners would possess to 
bring claims before the European Convention Tribunals. 
At any rate, the economic cost of seeking relief from the European Court is 
outweighed by the certain advantages of unifying European human rights law by 
restricting recourse to a single, supreme court. 
110. Indeed, individual petitions comprise the bulk of this opportunity: 
I t  seems that the right of access of private suitors has been crucial to 
bringing the system of European Human Rights Law alive. Between 1953 
and 1983, there were only 18 state petitions filed with the Commission, 
but there were 10,709 private claims. Of the 100 decisions and judgments 
rendered by the European Court of Human Rights from its inaugural 
sitting on April 20, 1959 until 1985, 98 were cases where individuals 
were the original petitioners. 
JANIS & KAY, supm note 85, at  93 (citation omitted). 
111. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 473. 
112. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 17, at  464. 
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The Convention's powerful, sublime aims warrant such devel- 
opment. Likewise, the Convention's member states will increas- 
ingly gain in understanding of and ability to ensure domestic 
liberties as the Convention develops a sophisticated corpus of 
case law. In view of these concerns, this comment suggests 
that, for now, the United Kingdom should subordinate chiefly 
political concerns to the greater and more compelling aim of 
establishing a developed, concrete jurisprudence of human 
rights on a decidedly European scale. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
An important, distinctively twentieth-century trend among 
European nations has been the move towards enumerating 
fundamental human rights. The United Kingdom has been con- 
servative in its embrace of this trend, especially in its approach 
towards recent European Community efforts to create a bill of 
rights. Underlying the United Kingdom's conservative image in 
this area is its refusal to  install its own domestic bill of rights. 
Although the United Kingdom has long been bound by the 
European Convention on Human Rights, its lack of an en- 
trenched rights bill requires those with Convention-based 
claims against the United Kingdom to invoke the processes of 
the European Commission and eventually the European Court 
of Human Rights. Domestic remedies for human rights viola- 
tions are scattered and incomplete, but the European Conven- 
tion enforcement mechanisms have proven successful in pro- 
tecting human rights within the United Kingdom. The current 
position of the United Kingdom is to avoid a hortatory procla- 
mation of rights. Instead, specific rights are developed one at a 
time employing the traditional processes of legislation and 
common-law interpretation. The European Convention's charac- 
ter as a sui generis, law-making authority corresponds appro- 
priately with such processes. 
Ultimately, the long-term task of building a truly viable 
European human rights standard will be served by emphasiz- 
ing the European Convention process: direct recourse to the 
European Commission of Human Rights and its companion 
European Court of Human Rights. The goal of a d i e d  Euro- 
pean human rights standard requires a single adjudication 
process. Two competing systems--one national, the other 
international-are undesirable because only a single system 
can provide a definitive interpretation of the European 
Convention's human rights norms. With the prospect of a truly 
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united Europe, efficiency in adjudicating human rights issues 
becomes a more important factor in the analysis of whether the 
United Kingdom should adopt a bill of rights. 
Assuming that furthering human rights per se within the 
Council of Europe nations is the primary goal of any human 
rights initiative, factors such as the United Kingdom's "embar- 
rassment" due to adverse rulings from the Court are irrelevant 
t o  the more compelling, more encompassing goal of effecting 
human rights throughout Europe. The relevant consideration is 
how the United Kingdom can benefit the entire European hu- 
man rights process. Adopting a bill of rights could detract from 
the overall efficiency of the adjudicative process by interposing 
a new set of rights requiring judicial interpretation to achieve 
their aims. To both promote European Convention aims and 
judicial efficiency through uniformity, this comment suggests 
that the United Kingdom continue to maintain its posture 
against a domestic bill of rights. 
Keith Cope 
